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Abstract
This paper shows that governance quality promotes positive net inflows of high-skilled
migrants. Home and foreign institutions influence both inflows and outflows, thus de-
termining the net flows of college graduate migrants. Therefore, institutions can affect
human capital through migration flows. Our empirical strategy is based on a random
utility model from which we derive the net balance of migrants and an exclusion re-
striction to control for the selection of migrants. We test the predictions of the model
using comprehensive matrices of migration by education level and a synthetic indicator
of governance quality. We account for endogeneity concerns by means of an instru-
mental strategy and we disentangle the effect of the quality of domestic and foreign
institutions on both inflows and outflows.
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1 Introduction
In an era when human capital is crucial for economic growth, factors attracting foreign workers
are as important as those refraining natives from emigrating. Both immigration and emigration
shape net migration flows and affect the human capital accumulation process.
In this paper, we investigate the effect of governance quality on net flows of human cap-
ital defined as differences between inflows and outflows of migrants by education level.1 We
find that the quality of institutions has a positive effect on the net inflow of college-educated
migrants. In particular, college graduates are more willing to migrate to countries with good
institutional quality, and they tend to emigrate more from countries with low governance quality
despite potentially greater migration costs. The results for the less educated have a slightly dif-
ferent pattern. More precisely, the low-skilled are also more likely to leave countries with low
institutional quality, but we find no effect of the quality of foreign institutions on their migra-
tion choices. Therefore, the difference in institutional quality between the home country and the
destination country seems to be less important to explain the net migration flows of low-skilled
migrants compared to high-skilled migrants.
The analysis of the paper proceeds in three steps. First, we develop a theoretical framework
and use a random utility model of migration that delivers migration balances as a function of
bilateral differences in country characteristics. The model predicts that net migration flows are
a function of asymmetries in the quality of institutions, wages, population size, and diasporas.
The main advantage of focusing on net migration flows rather than on unilateral emigration or
immigration flows separately is that all symmetric factors (observed or unobserved) affecting
both immigration and emigration cancel each other out. Therefore, the model itself provides
a rationale for an exclusion restriction to control for the selection of migrants. In addition,
focusing on net flows reduces the scope of omitted variable problems. Any unobserved bilateral
factor that influences immigration and emigration symmetrically, such as cultural proximity,
does not affect net flows.
In the second step, we provide descriptive evidence of the model by correlating net flows de-
rived from comprehensive matrices of migration (Artuc, Docquier, Ozden, and Parsons, 2015)
and a synthetic indicator of governance quality derived from the six governance measures pro-
vided by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009). We deal with selection on inflows and out-
flows by following the strategy of Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) and, as predicted by
the model, we use the symmetric bilateral components of migration costs as exclusion restric-
tions. The results show a positive correlation between governance quality and net migration
1In the analysis, we take into account the possible imperfect substitutability between emigrants and immigrants.
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flows and provide descriptive evidence for the predictions of the model. However, these re-
gressions can suffer both from an omitted variable and a reverse causality problem. The first
can result from unobserved asymmetric factors that influence both net migration flows and the
quality of institutions. The second can be due to: i) immigrants directly influencing the institu-
tions of the host country by voicing their opinion and voting (Hirschman, 1970); ii) emigration
rates increasing the incentives for the elite to improve the quality of institutions (Docquier and
Rapoport, 2003); and iii) emigrants voicing their opinion from abroad (Li and Hale, 2005;
Spilimbergo, 2009; Docquier, Lodigiani, Rapoport, and Schiff, 2016).2 Thus, a sound instru-
mental strategy is needed to capture the causal effect. We instrument the distance in the quality
of governance between two countries with the distance in the Scrabble index of their name.
Language traits influence the set of norms and values which constitute institutions in a coun-
try (Tabellini, 2008). We show that the quality of institutions is negatively correlated with the
complexity of a country’s name. Therefore, countries with more complex languages - and thus
more complex names - tend to have worse institutions.3 At the same time, we show that mi-
grants do not take into account the complexity of a country’s name when migrating. Therefore,
the instrument is correlated with the endogenous variable and is orthogonal to migration flows.
Both the first and second stages of our 2SLS strategy perform as expected and allow us to iden-
tify the positive and significant impact of governance quality on migration balances for college
graduates.
Finally, in the third step, we disentangle the positive effect of the quality of institutions on
net migration flows by looking separately at inflows and outflows and by separating the effect
of home and foreign institutions. We find that college graduates take into account both home
and foreign institutional quality when choosing where to migrate, while the low-skilled only
consider home institutional quality. This can be the result of the low-skilled having more trouble
acquiring and/or processing information on foreign countries. The insignificant elasticity of the
low-skilled with respect to foreign institutions helps explain why the difference in institutional
quality between home and foreign countries is less important for low-skilled than for high-
2Li and Hale (2005) were the first to provide a cross-country investigation of the impact of skilled labor mi-
gration on a sending country’s institutional development. Spilimbergo (2009) found that foreign-trained students
promote democracy in their home countries only if the foreign education was acquired in a democratic country.
More recently, Docquier et al. (2016) found a robust and positive effect of emigration on the quality of institutions
in a panel setting.
3Tabellini (2008) argues that language can influence the culture traits at the basis of institutions and their
quality, such as the general morality of the people living in a country, defined as "the universal applicability of
rules of just conduct". At the same time, Chen (2013) shows that linguistic traits affect both economic and non-
economic attitudes. On the one hand, a more complex language might have led to more difficulties in coordination
and comprehension, thus limiting the development of institutions. On the other hand, it might have contributed to
developing more complex and thus less efficient institutions (Room, 2015).
3
skilled net migration flows.
This paper contributes to an increasing segment of the literature on the determinants of in-
ternational migration. Previous work studied the determinants of bilateral migration stocks and
flows (e.g. Belot and Hatton, 2012; Mayda, 2010; Grogger and Hanson, 2011; Beine, Docquier,
and Ozden, 2011; Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2015, 2013), or aggregate immigra-
tion and emigration flows (e.g. Pedersen, Pytlikova, and Smith, 2008; Docquier, Lohest, and
Marfouk, 2007). Our contribution to this literature is twofold. First, we focus on the deter-
minants of the size and skill structure of net migration flows (i.e. differences between inflows
and outflows by education level). Second, while previous studies analyzed the role of income
(Belot and Hatton, 2012; Grogger and Hanson, 2011), migrants’ networks (Beine et al., 2011),
or migration policies (Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2013), we focus on the role of
governance quality. However, in comparative growth studies, the quality of institutions has been
considered by some influential economists as a major explanation of cross-country inequality
(e.g. Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2005; Acemoglu, Johnson,
Robinson, and Yared, 2005; Shleifer, de Silanes, and La Porta, 2008). Hence, it is worth inves-
tigating whether the effect of institutions on growth is partly channelled through the mobility of
highly educated workers and less educated ones.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the micro-foundations
of our empirical strategy. The data are described in Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical
results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy is based on a random utility model of migration, which provides a ratio-
nale for an exclusion restriction to control for the selection of migrants.
Random utility model. Individuals born in an origin country i (i = 1, ..., I) decide whether
to stay in their home country or emigrate to another country j (j = 1, ..., J). For simplicity,
we abstract from skill heterogeneity, but our micro-foundations could be made specific to a
particular skill, age, or gender group. The indirect utility of an individual is linear in income (as
in Grogger and Hanson (2011)), in the quality of institutions, and includes possible migration
costs.
In a given group, the utility of an individual born in country i and staying in country i is
given by
uii = αwi + βGi + εii ≡ uii + εii
where wi denotes the expected labor income in location i, Gi denotes the quality of governance
4
and institutions, εii is a spatially uncorrelated individual-specific iid random term;4 we assume
εii follows a type-I extreme-value distribution. Coefficient α measures the marginal utility of
income; and β denotes the preference for staying in a country with good institutions. The utility
obtained when the same person migrates to location j is given by
uij = αwj + βGj − Cij + εij ≡ uij + εij
where wj , Gj and εij denote the same variables as above, and Cij captures moving and assim-
ilation costs that are borne by the migrant. Here, coefficient β captures the preference for the
quality of institutions at destination. When the random term follows an iid extreme-value dis-
tribution, we can apply the results of McFadden (1984) and write the log ratio of emigrants in
country j to residents of i as:
ln
[
Mij
Mii
]
= α [wj − wi] + β [Gj −Gi]− Cij (1)
Migration costs are not observable. In line with the rest of the literature, we assume they
increase with the distance dij between the two countries (i.e. geographical, cultural, and lin-
guistic distances), decrease with the size of the established migration network or diaspora Nij ,
decrease with the size of the native population in the host country Mjj (a country’s capacity to
host migrants increases with the size of the native population), and decrease with the quality of
institutions at origin Gi. These effects are likely to vary across groups. Using the logarithmic,
we write
Cij = δ ln dij −  lnNij − ρ lnMjj − λGi (2)
where coefficient λ captures the fact that bad institutions and low government effectiveness at
origin can be responsible for greater emigration costs. It is well known that emigrating from
Socialist countries is very costly; think about the thousands of Cubans taking to the sea to
reach the United States on makeshift crafts. More generally, McKenzie (2007) collected data
on passport costs in 127 countries and showed that they represent more than 10 percent of
the annual income per capita in 13 countries (e.g. 125 percent in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, 60 percent in Chad, 51 percent in Burundi, etc.). High passport costs are found to be
associated with poor governance, especially in terms of the quality of the bureaucracy, and with
lower levels of migration. Moreover, skill differences in retention policies can be implemented
by governments aiming at preventing the brain drain.
4See Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2013) for a relaxation of this hypothesis.
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Migration outflows. Plugging (2) into (1) gives the expression for the bilateral migration
outflow from i to j:
lnMij = α (wj − wi) + βGj − (β − λ)Gi − δ ln dij +  lnNij + ρ lnMjj + lnMii
Clearly, the bilateral migration outflow is an asymmetric function of governance quality at des-
tination and origin. The coefficient for governance at destination only captures the preference
channel, while the coefficient for governance at origin captures the joint effects of preferences
and migration costs. When this expression is negative, it means that less than one migrant is
willing to move from i to j. This means a zero migration flow is observed, a frequent situation
in the data since there is none or very little migration between some distant country pairs.5
Migration balances. For each pair of countries, we define a migration balance as the log
ratio of immigrants to emigrants. Combining expressions for lnMij and lnMji from (3), the
structural equation for the migration balance is the following:
ln
Mji
Mij
= 2α (wi − wj) + (2β − λ) (Gi −Gj) +  ln Nji
Nij
+ (1− ρ) ln Mjj
Mii
It shows that the migration balance improves with the wage gap between countries, the differ-
ence in institutional quality, the log-ratio of established diasporas, and the log-ratio of stayers’
populations. Interestingly, the bilateral migration balance only depends on the difference in
governance quality between the destination and origin countries, and the coefficient for this
variable jointly accounts for the preference for good governance (2β), and the effect of gover-
nance quality on emigration costs (λ).
We cannot estimate (3) using OLS given the high occurrence of zeroes in both inflows and
outflows. In addition, we cannot use the PPML estimator because some net flows have negative
values. We proceed similarly to Helpman et al. (2008) who analyzed net trade flows across
country pairs. We first run a Probit regression separately for inflows and outflows. In both
cases, the dependent variable takes value one if we observe a positive flow and zero otherwise.
The independent variables are the same as in equation (3), plus the exclusion restrictions. Our
theoretical micro-foundations show that symmetric variables (geographic, linguistic, and cul-
tural distances, dij) balance out in (3) and do not affect the size of migration balances. We use
these bilateral symmetric characteristics to predict the probability that both lnMij and lnMji
are positive. In other words, the random utility model itself provides the rationale for the use
5In practice, some reported zeroes might not reflect the actual absence of migrants. Due to confidentiality and
disclosure rules, some statistics offices report a zero when the diaspora size is below a threshold value.
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of exclusion restrictions in the empirical strategy. From these Probit regressions, we compute
the Mills ratios for both inflows and outflows (lnRji and lnRij), and we take their difference
(lnRji− lnRij). In Helpman et al. (2008), the two Mills ratios control for the probability of ob-
serving zero import or export flows. Their interpretation is that none of the potential exporting
firms can pay the fixed cost of exporting. Similarly, in our paper, the two Mills ratios control for
the probability that none of the potential emigrants or immigrants find the benefits of migrating
higher than the cost. In the second stage, we run an OLS regression as in (3), augmented with
the difference in the Mills ratios.
3 Data and Stylized Facts
The core of our analysis is based on the estimation of equation (3) for which we need six in-
puts: migration flows (both inflows and outflows), wages (for both high-skilled and low-skilled
migrants), size of migration networks, size of resident populations, quality of governance, and
geographical variables as exclusion restrictions. In this section, we explain our data sources and
present some stylized facts and descriptive statistics.
3.1 Data Sources
Migration data. The migration data were obtained from Artuc et al. (2015) who produced
195x195 comprehensive matrices of bilateral migration stocks. These matrices are computed
for two skill groups (college graduates and less educated individuals) and for two years (1990
and 2000). Migration is defined on the basis of the country of birth. The dataset only includes
people aged 25 and over as a proxy for the working-age population. This excludes a large
number of students who emigrate temporarily to complete their education, or children who
migrate with their families and are not yet active in the labor market. The methodology used
in Artuc et al. (2015) consists of three steps. The starting point is the database described in
Docquier, Lowell, and Marfouk (2009) documenting bilateral migration stocks to OECD host
countries. It is based on a collection of census and register immigration data by country of birth
and educational level for 30 OECD countries. The second step consists of a collection of similar
immigration data from 46 non-OECD destinations in 2000, and 30 countries in 1990. Finally,
the data collected in steps 1 and 2 are used to predict the size and structure of migration to the
remaining 119 non-OECD host countries in 2000 and 135 countries in 1990.
The relevant migration variables to be used in our analysis are the log net migration flows,
ln
Mij
Mji
, and the log of the diasporas, ln Nij
Nji
. The net flow of immigrants to a country can be
recovered by taking the difference of the logged inflows (Mij) and outflows (Mji). Both inflows
and outflows are computed as the change in bilateral stocks of migrants between 1990 and
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2000, adjusted for the average mortality rate of individuals aged 65 and over in the destination
countries. The construction of destination-specific mortality rates is based on life expectancy
data taken from the World Development Indicators.6 Since we are in a net setting, we observe
the same country pair twice (e.g. both Italy-Belgium and Belgium-Italy). In this way, the sample
contains the same net migration flow twice (but with opposite signs). To avoid inflating our
estimation sample and having errors correlated within the same country pair, we only consider
each country pair once. The two diasporas, Nij and Nji, are simply measured as the stocks of
foreign-born people in a destination country i from a certain origin country j in 1990. Since
the net balance is computed separately for each of the two educational levels, our diaspora
measures are also skill specific. We believe that when migrating to a foreign country, skill-
specific diasporas are more effective than the total diaspora in attracting migrants from the
same education group because of common interests and affinity.
The data on the resident national populations are also from Artuc et al. (2015). Variables
Mii and Mjj are computed as the difference between the resident and immigrant populations in
2000 and in 1990. Migration balances, diasporas, and stayers’ populations are computed both
for college graduates and for less educated individuals.
Workers’ relative productivity by origin. It is widely documented that many immigrants
with higher education tend to find jobs in occupations typically staffed by less educated natives
(see Mattoo, Neagu, and Özden (2008)). In particular, highly educated immigrants trained in
developing countries may be less productive in high-skill jobs than natives with similar edu-
cational degrees. Evidence of such heterogeneity in the quality of education is provided by
Coulombe and Tremblay (2009), who compare the skill intensity and schooling levels of Cana-
dian immigrants and natives who were both submitted to standardized tests in literacy, math, and
problem-solving. These tests provide measures of proficiency that are comparable across coun-
tries and over time. On this basis, Coulombe and Tremblay (2009) estimate a "skill-schooling
gap" expressed in years of schooling. A skill-schooling gap of n years for a given country
means that Canadian nationals with y years of schooling are as productive as immigrants with
y + n years of schooling. The greater the skill-schooling gap, the lower the quality of educa-
tion in the country of origin. Simple bivariate OLS regressions show that the skill-schooling
gap is a decreasing function of the per worker income in the origin country. Their -0.10 point
estimate of the slope coefficient indicates that the skill-schooling gap is one year smaller when
6Several papers, such as Beine et al. (2011) and Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2015), used a similar
technique to obtain emigration and/or immigration flows. We are aware that computing migration flows using the
adjusted difference in stocks is not optimal, since mortality differences between natives and migrants and return
migration can introduce noise. However, this is the only available alternative in the absence of actual data on
migration flows by education level.
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the per worker income increases by USD 10,000 in the origin country. Using this estimate and
cross-country data on per worker income, we construct an indicator of the skill-schooling gap
for each origin country. Then, assuming that one year of schooling generates a productivity
gain of 8 percent, we estimate the relative productivity of educated immigrants and natives in
each country, with a benchmark value of one for workers trained in Canada (as well as workers
trained in richer origin countries, i.e. the upper bound of this index is one). For example, col-
lege graduate immigrants from Angola and Portugal have productivity levels equal to 73 and
85 percent of Canadian college graduates, respectively. Given this heterogeneity in educational
quality among countries, we use adjusted migration balances in our benchmark specification.
For each origin country, we weight high-skilled migration flows by the relative productivity of
college-educated emigrants to Canada, thus accounting for the imperfect comparability between
inflows and outflows. In a robustness analysis, we consider unadjusted migration balances by
simply differentiating exits from entries.
Wage rates by education level. In many empirical studies, wages are approximated by the
level of GDP per worker (e.g. Mayda (2010)). We need wage data here for the two education
levels (as in Grogger and Hanson (2011), and Belot and Hatton (2012)). To identify skill-
specific wage rates, we need data on average wages, on the skill composition of the labor force,
and on wage disparities across groups. Assuming a constant share of labor income of 70 percent
in all countries, the average wage of workers is assumed to be equal to 70 percent of the GDP
per worker. By definition, this average wage is a weighted sum of high-skilled and low-skilled
wages. The data on GDP per worker in USD in 1990 and 2000 are obtained from the World
Development Indicators. The data on the education structure of the resident labor force are
obtained from Artuc et al. (2015). As for the wage ratios between college graduates and the
less educated, we combine data on returns to schooling and average years of schooling by
educational attainment. Mincerian returns to schooling, MR, are available for 54 countries in
Hendricks (2004). For the same countries, we use Barro and Lee (2010) data and compute the
difference in years of schooling, DY, between college graduates and the less educated. The
wage ratio is then computed as (1 + MR)DY . The resulting wages are expressed in thousands
of USD.
Quality of governance. We use data from the "Governance Matters" project, started with
the seminal work of Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999).7 The database reports six
broad dimensions of governance – ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5 – for over 200 coun-
tries over the period 1996-2011: (i) Voice and Accountability captures perceptions of the extent
7The most recent methodology is described in Kaufmann et al. (2009).
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to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as free-
dom of expression, freedom of association, and free media; (ii) Political Stability and Absence
of Violence measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and
terrorism; (iii) Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services,
the quality of the civil service, and the degree of its independence from political pressures,
the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s
commitment to such policies; (iv) Regulatory Quality captures perceptions of the ability of the
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that allow and promote
private sector development; (v) Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and
violence; and (vi) Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well
as the "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.
These six dimensions of governance exhibit pairwise correlation rates from 0.60 to 0.95,
with a mean of 0.85. For this reason, it is very difficult to identify the dimensions that induce
the largest push/pull effects. We thus perform a principal component analysis (PCA) to reduce
the dimension of the governance indicators. Using an orthogonal transformation, the PCA cre-
ates an artificial variable which accounts for as much of the variability observed in the data.
In our analysis, we use the standardized first principal component of the six governance vari-
ables which will be referred to as PCA. We use PCA as a synthetic indicator of governance; it
accounts for 88% of the total variability in governance quality.
Distance variables. Distance variables (geographical, cultural, and linguistic variables) are
usually considered important predictors of migration flows. Because of their symmetric nature,
they represent our exclusion restrictions.8 In particular, for each country dyad, we use the log
of the distance between capital cities in kilometers and dummies indicating the existence of
colonial links after 1945, common official language, and border sharing. All variables are from
the GeoDist dataset, built by CEPII9.
8We follow the literature in making this symmetry assumption. However, we acknowledge the fact that the
effect of geographical distance can be asymmetric: going from poor country A to rich country B might be more
costly than going from rich country B to poor country A. This might be more problematic for south-north flows,
while it should be less important for north-north and south-south corridors.
9Available at http://www.cepii.fr
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3.2 Stylized Facts
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. As explained above, our sample includes only half
of the net migration flows to avoid counting the same corridor twice. By excluding the main
diagonal (where origin and destination coincide), we end up with 18,915 country pairs. About
30 percent of them exhibit positive net flows, and the remaining 70 percent show a zero balance
due to the absence of both inflows and outflows. The highest net balances in the data are the
corridors from the Philippines to the United States for highly skilled migrants (with a log ratio
of 12.7) and from Mexico to the United States for less educated migrants (with a log ratio
of 12.5). Each of them roughly represents a net inflow of more than 300,000 people into the
United States over the nineties (and conversely a net outflow of 300,000 for the Philippines and
Mexico). Table 1 also shows that wage disparities are greater for college graduates than for
the less educated. As for the geographical variables, the average geographic distance between
two countries is equal to 8.7 thousand kilometers, only one percent of our country pairs have
a colonial relationship, 1.5 percent share a common border, and 15 percent share a common
official language.
To have better insight into our main variable of interest for the 195 countries in the sample,
Figure 1 shows the density of PCA for two groups of countries: high-income OECD countries
(referred to as the North) and other countries (referred to as the South).10 The North exhibits
a higher average quality of governance and a much lower dispersion than the South. As far as
the dependent variable is concerned, Figure 2 plots the density of the balance for both high-
skilled and low-skilled migrants.11 They are both centered around zero and it is easy to note
that the dispersion is slightly higher for the low-skilled than for the high-skilled, meaning that
the balances for the high-skilled tend to be smaller than those for the less educated. Finally, we
combine the information on balances and quality of institution and we plot them separately for
the high-skilled (Figure 3) and the low-skilled (Figure 4). Both graphs show a clear positive
correlation, suggesting that, for each country pair, the country with the higher quality of institu-
tions tends to experience a surplus of immigrants. The econometric analysis of the next section
will also shed light on potential differences between the high-skilled and the low-skilled.
4 Results
This section presents the results of our empirical analysis. Our main variables of interest are
the migration balances of college graduates and less educated migrants, measured as logged
10The classification is available at http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-
groups.
11We use only non-zero values.
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net migrant flows (lnMji − lnMij) observed between the years 1990 and 2000. In the first
sub-section, we find that migration balances are positively correlated with the six indicators
of governance and with the synthetic indicator (PCA) derived from our principal component
analysis. We then show that this positive relation is reinforced, in the case of the high-skilled,
when an instrumental variable strategy is used, suggesting a causal impact of governance on
high-skilled net migration flows. In the second sub-section, we disentangle the effect of home
and destination institutional quality on both outflows and inflows.
4.1 Governance and Net Migration Flows
Table 2 presents the OLS estimation results of equation (3) using the six different measures of
governance provided in Kaufmann et al. (2009). Panel A gives the results for college graduates
and panel B shows the results for the less educated. Our set of controls includes the differences
in skill-specific wage rates, populations of stayers left behind, sizes of the network/diaspora,
and Mills ratios. Notice that the coefficients for these variables have intuitive signs. Net mi-
gration flows increase with the "destination-origin", skill-specific wage gap. The higher the
wage in destination i with respect to origin j, the greater the net migration flow from j to i.
Net migration flows also increase with the difference in network sizes. If the diaspora from
j to i exceeded that of i to j in 1990, this spurred net migration flows from j to i during the
nineties (see Carrington, Detragiache, and Vishwanath (1996); Beine et al. (2011)). The es-
timated coefficients are greater for college graduates than for the less educated. Finally, the
difference in Mills ratios (∆IMR) is always significant in Panel B; it is significant in two re-
gressions of panel A, meaning that it is important to account for sample selection, especially for
the low-skilled. Interestingly, the "destination-origin" difference in governance quality between
two countries is always associated with greater net migration inflows, whatever the indicator
of governance quality. The highest coefficients are obtained with "Government Efficiency",
"Control of Corruption", and "Rule of Law". However, since the correlation between the six
governance indicators is very large, in column (7), we perform additional OLS regressions us-
ing the synthetic governance indicator (PCA). In this case as well, the migration balance is
positively associated with the "destination-origin" difference in PCA.
As explained above, OLS regressions might suffer from endogeneity problems. The posi-
tive correlation rates between governance and migration balances identified in Table 2 could be
driven by a reverse causation link between these two variables, or by the effect of an omitted
variable. The first problem may arise if migration affects home and/or foreign institutions (e.g.
Li and Hale, 2005; Spilimbergo, 2009; Docquier et al., 2016). The second emerges if any unob-
served bilateral component influences both the difference in the quality of institutions and the
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net migration flows. The use of net migration flows substantially mitigates this problem, since
symmetric unobserved characteristics cancel each other out when taking the difference between
inflows and outflows. Still, some asymmetric unobserved characteristics could drive the re-
sults. To solve these problems, we use a similar approach to Biavaschi, Giulietti, and Siddique
(2013): we perform a two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) analysis and instrument the distance in
the synthetic governance indicator with the distance in the complexity of the destination and
origin countries’ names.12 In particular, we measure the complexity of country names by the
English Scrabble score of each country’s English name and take the difference between origin
and destination.13 Our identification strategy relies on two key assumptions: the first is that
cross-country variation in the quality of institutions is correlated with the complexity of country
names (and so the distance in the complexity of country names is correlated with the distance
in the quality of institutions). The second is that the complexity of a country’s name is not
correlated with migration flows.
With respect to the first requirement, different papers argue that language can affect the val-
ues at the basis of institutions and their quality. For instance, Chen (2013) shows that linguistic
traits affect economic and non-economic attitudes, and Tabellini (2008) finds that language af-
fects the values underlying the general morality, defined as "the universal applicability of rules
of just conduct". Following this reasoning, a more complex language might have caused more
difficulties in coordination and comprehension, thus limiting the development of institutions. At
the same time, a more complex language might have contributed to developing more complex
and thus less efficient institutions (Room, 2015). In both cases, the Scrabble score of a country
name should be negatively correlated with governance quality. Our analysis supports this hy-
pothesis: Figure 5 shows a negative relationship between the complexity of country names and
12Biavaschi et al. (2013) instrument the Americanization of migrants’ names using the English Scrabble index
of each original migrant name.
13More in detail, we assign the English Scrabble score to each letter composing the English name of a country
and then add them up. For example, low Scrabble scores are Israel (6), Peru (6), and Austria (7), while high
Scrabble scores are Zimbabwe (26), Kyrgyzstan (30), and Mozambique (34). We believe that it would have been
more appropriate to use the Scrabble index in the language of the origin country to evaluate the complexity of the
name of the destination in the origin country’s official language (in other words, we would have used “Francia"
- Scrabble score: 12 - for the flow of Italians emigrating to France). However, there are several problems to
implement this strategy: i) Scrabble does not exist in all languages (e.g. Chinese); ii) datasets containing the name
of countries in different languages have limited language coverage; iii) sometimes, origin countries have more than
one official language (e.g. Belgium). Therefore, the English Scrabble and the English name are the easiest solution
to avoid making more important assumptions and cutting the sample size of our estimations. This choice is not as
extreme as one might think for two reasons: first, the correlation of the Scrabble scores in different languages is
more than 95%, which means that the difference in the complexity of a given letter across different languages is
quite small; second, excluding some notable exceptions (e.g. Germany, Croatia, etc.), the names of countries tend
to be quite consistent across different languages.
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the quality of institutions (and this negative correlation is significant at 5%).
With respect to the second condition to have a proper 2SLS, we need the bilateral difference
in the complexity of country names to be uncorrelated with migration flows. In Figures 6 and 7,
we plot outflows against the complexity of country names, both for high-skilled and low-skilled
migrants. No clear pattern can be detected and the correlation is not significantly different from
zero at the 5% level. This missing correlation is unlikely to be driven by the effect of migration
on the Scrabble, since migrants cannot change the names of countries.14 Therefore, migrants
do not seem to take into account the complexity of country names when choosing where to mi-
grate. One further threat to fulfill this condition is that the correlation between the distance in the
Scrabble and the distance in governance quality comes entirely from linguistic proximity. This
can be potentially problematic because linguistic proximity is correlated with migration costs
and thus with migration flows. Using the linguistic proximity measures provided by Melitz and
Toubal (2014), we observe that the correlation with the Scrabble distance of country names is
below 15% and never significant. Therefore, our instrument does not seem to capture linguis-
tic proximity15 and it proves to be significantly correlated with the endogenous variable and
uncorrelated with the outcome variable – as the assumptions of 2SLS require.
Column 1 of Table 3 presents the first stage of our 2SLS regression. As expected, the bilat-
eral distance in the complexity of country names is positively and significantly correlated to the
distance in the quality of the institutions. In most cases, the first stage F-statistic is in line with
the usual thresholds both for the high-skilled and the low-skilled. Looking at the estimates of
the second stage in column 1 of Table 4, we observe that an increase in the "destination-origin"
difference in governance quality induces a greater high-skilled net migration flow. For the low-
skilled instead, this relation remains positive, but it becomes insignificant. The magnitude of
the coefficients is greater than in Table 2, suggesting that OLS estimates can be downward bi-
ased by a negative reverse effect of migration balances on the quality of institutions. Therefore,
the 2SLS procedure confirms the positive causal relationship between the quality of institutions
and high-skilled net migration flows, while the estimates for the low-skilled are still positive,
but lose significance.
Besides endogeneity, some other issues might bias our results. First, we adjust our in-
14Moreover, the extent to which human capital per se can affect institutions has been found quite limited (Ace-
moglu, Gallego, and Robinson, 2014)
15In any case, if the effect of linguistic proximity is symmetric, its effect is canceled out anyway when taking the
difference between inflows and outflows. If instead it is asymmetric (as shown for English-speaking destinations by
Adsera and Pytlikova (2015)), this could have been more problematic in presence of a strong correlation between
the distance in the Scrabble and the linguistic proximity. In the following, we provide evidence that this is not
problematic in our case.
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flows and outflows to take into account dynamics that may influence the change in the stock
of migrants, such as mortality. If there is a correlation between the size of the adjustment and
the quality of institutions, the results may be biased. To check for this issue, we re-estimate
our model using only the unadjusted (observed) flows. Both for high-skilled and low-skilled,
the results remain unchanged (Column 2, Table 4). Second, part of the cells used have been
imputed. If the probability of imputing a cell is correlated to the quality of institutions and the
instrument, this might cause biased estimates. In column 3 of Table 4, we use only non-imputed
cells for our estimations, and we see that, despite the decrease in the number of observations
(divided by 10), our results hold. Third, besides the fact that our instrument is not significantly
correlated with linguistic proximity, it is worth checking whether our results hold when ruling
out the possibility that linguistic proximity exerts a differential effect on migration flows when
the destination has English as an official language, as shown by Adsera and Pytlikova (2015).
To check this, we exclude from the sample all observations in which either i or j have English
as an official language.16 Column 4 of Table 4 shows that by excluding the possibility of asym-
metric effects due to linguistic proximity, the results are still confirmed, despite the decrease by
one third of the sample size. Fourth, visa restrictions could represent an important omitted vari-
able for the estimations. While our instrument should be orthogonal to any asymmetry in visa
restrictions, it can be interesting to look at the effect of this variable and check whether indeed
there is any asymmetric effect. We use the dummy variable constructed by Neumayer (2005)
capturing the need of a visa to travel from an origin to a destination. The difference between
origin and destination visa policies takes value 1 if there is a restriction in the origin country,
-1 if there is a restriction in the destination country, and zero if there are restrictions in both
countries or in none. While our results on the quality of institutions still hold, this additional
variable is not significant for either the high-skilled or the low-skilled (Column 5 of Table 4).
4.2 Governance and Gross Migration Flows
Having demonstrated that net migration flows are affected by governance quality, we now dis-
entangle the effect of home and foreign institutions on both inflows and outflows. In particular,
we estimate equation (3) using the PPML estimation method developed by Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006).17 Table 5 (column 1 for high-skilled and column 2 for low-skilled migrants)
shows that home institutions are negatively correlated with migration outflows, i.e. more virtu-
16Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Cameroon, Canada, Dominica,
Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, Ireland, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Malta, Mauritius,
Namibia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, the Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, the Solomon Islands, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, the United Kingdom, Vanuatu, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
17Please note that PPML works only with the dependent variable in levels.
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ous countries have fewer emigrants. When looking at foreign institutions instead, we observe
that high-skilled emigrants tend to choose destinations with higher-quality institutions. Instead,
this correlation is not significant for the low-skilled. The results for inflows are complementary
to those for outflows (columns 3 and 4, Table 5). College graduates flow into countries with
better institutions and avoid those with bad governance quality. The low-skilled instead tend to
look only at the quality of institutions in the origin country.
These results suggest that the highly skilled care both about home and foreign institutions,
while the low-skilled seem to take into account only the institutional quality in their origin
country. This can be the result of the low-skilled having lower access to information on foreign
institutions. For example, economic conditions might influence the possibility of acquiring
relevant data and low educational attainment may limit the ability to process information and
to make an informed decision. This skill difference is also important in our context: for the
low-skilled, the difference in the quality of institutions between countries matters less than for
the highly skilled and this may be the cause of the insignificant coefficient for the net setting.
Finally, the coefficients for all the other variables have the expected signs. More specifically,
the wage effect is negative for outflows, meaning that an increase in wages in the home country
will retain both high- and low-skilled migrants. Accordingly, the effect is opposite for inflows,
so that higher wages at home increase the number of immigrants. As expected, the diaspora
effect is positive and significant for outflows, since the higher the diaspora at destination, the
larger the outflow to that country. The same applies to the foreign diaspora: the more foreign
citizens live in the home country, the larger the inflow from the foreign country to the home
country.
5 Conclusion
Bilateral differences in governance quality impact the size and educational structure of bilat-
eral net migration flows. Therefore, the quality of institutions can affect human capital stocks
through migration. This paper shows that countries with better governance quality experience
positive net flows of college graduate migrants, while countries with worse institutions tend to
experience negative net flows. College graduates are more reactive to governance quality and
take into account both home and destination governance quality when choosing to emigrate.
The low-skilled seem to focus instead only on local conditions in their choices. Therefore,
bilateral differences in institutional quality are more important for high-skilled than for low-
skilled net migration flows.
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Figure 5: PCA and the Complexity of Country Names
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Figure 6: High-Skilled Outflow and PCA Figure 7: Low-Skilled Outflow and PCA
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Net high-skilled 18,915 0.0108 2.1790 -12.7328 11.6493
Net high-skilled Down. 18,915 0.0091 2.0304 -12.2595 11.1927
Net low-skilled 18,915 0.0033 2.4537 -12.5255 12.2559
Net low-skilled Down. 18,915 0.0112 2.5422 -12.7413 12.2585
∆ Wagehs 18,915 0.0332 41.1990 -206.1103 204.7582
∆ Wagels 18,915 -0.0042 16.5172 -63.9722 63.7881
∆ Log Nativeshs 18,915 0.0440 4.8240 -17.0866 17.0866
∆ Log Nativesls 18,915 0.0152 5.7443 -19.1104 19.1104
∆ Log Diaspora 18,915 0.0151 2.1061 -12.3563 10.8819
∆ PCA 16,836 -0.0086 1.4180 -4.2308 4.2800
∆ Control of Corruption 17,955 -0.0052 1.3962 -4.2007 4.1665
∆ Rule of Law 18,721 -0.0057 1.3919 -4.1124 4.1081
∆ Political Stability 16,836 -0.0095 1.3922 -4.1294 4.0502
∆ Violence & Accountability 18,721 -0.0105 1.3957 -3.6341 3.6386
∆ Government Efficiency 17,955 -0.0032 1.3949 -4.1646 4.1758
∆ Regulatory Quality 17,955 -0.0061 1.3839 -4.3315 4.5501
Log Distance 17,766 8.7660 0.7769 4.0879 9.9010
Colonial Links 17,766 0.0109 0.1039 0 1
Common Language 17,766 0.1548 0.3617 0 1
Common Border 17,766 0.0157 0.1245 0 1
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis.
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Table 2: Net Migration Flows and Quality of Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PANEL A: High-skilled
∆ Control of Corruption 0.257∗∗∗
(0.013)
∆ Rule of Law 0.208∗∗∗
(0.012)
∆ Pol. Stability 0.141∗∗∗
(0.012)
∆ Voice and Account. 0.166∗∗∗
(0.010)
∆ Governm. Effectiveness 0.271∗∗∗
(0.013)
∆ Regul. Quality 0.225∗∗∗
(0.012)
∆ PCA 0.254∗∗∗
(0.013)
∆ Wage 0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
∆ Population -0.008∗∗∗ -0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.013∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.006∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆ Diaspora 0.554∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
∆IMR 0.046 0.066 -0.233∗∗ 0.112 0.123 0.037 0.200∗
(0.092) (0.096) (0.106) (0.101) (0.094) (0.094) (0.104)
R2 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46
Observations 17,020 17,578 15,931 17,578 17,020 17,020 15,931
PANEL B: low-skilled
∆ Control of Corruption 0.301∗∗∗
(0.018)
∆ Rule of Law 0.256∗∗∗
(0.016)
∆ Pol. Stability 0.165∗∗∗
(0.016)
∆ Voice and Account. 0.241∗∗∗
(0.013)
∆ Governm. Effectiveness 0.338∗∗∗
(0.019)
∆ Regul. Quality 0.236∗∗∗
(0.017)
∆ PCA 0.322∗∗∗
(0.018)
∆ Wage 0.030∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
∆ Population -0.019∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆ Diaspora 0.464∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
∆IMR 0.918∗∗∗ 1.059∗∗∗ 0.797∗∗∗ 1.277∗∗∗ 1.301∗∗∗ 1.152∗∗∗ 1.397∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.144) (0.153) (0.146) (0.148) (0.151) (0.156)
R2 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.35
Observations 17,020 17,578 15,931 17,578 17,020 17,020 15,931
Notes: All regressions are run by OLS. The dependent variable is the log net migration flow. Panel A
shows results for high-skilled migrants and Panel B shows results for low-skilled migrants. We use the
6 different measures of governance from Kaufmann et al. (1999) and the principal component derived
from them. For more details on the governance indicators and controls, see Section 3. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3: IV: First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Adjusted Observed Non-Imputed Non-English Visa
Migrants Migrants Cells Dest.|Orig. Restrictions
PANEL A: High-skilled
∆ Scrabble 0.052∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.047) (0.016) (0.013)
∆ Wage 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
∆ Population 0.004∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001)
∆ Diaspora 0.152∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004)
∆ VISA 0.114∗∗∗
(0.019)
∆IMR -3.670∗∗∗ -3.670∗∗∗ -7.340∗∗∗ -3.397∗∗∗ -3.842∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.059) (0.305) (0.075) (0.058)
R2 0.47 0.47 0.39 0.43 0.49
F-Statistic 16.01 15.85 6.16 12.29 20.63
Observations 15,931 15,931 1,830 10,273 15,225
PANEL B: low-skilled
∆ Scrabble 0.024∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.007) (0.039) (0.014) (0.012)
∆ Wage 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.001 0.018∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
∆ Population 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
∆ Diaspora -0.204∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.385∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.225∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.020) (0.007) (0.005)
∆ VISA -0.058∗∗∗
(0.017)
∆IMR -3.524∗∗∗ -3.524∗∗∗ -5.782∗∗∗ -3.127∗∗ -3.738∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.068) (0.265) (0.083) (0.068)
R2 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.61
F-Statistic 15.86 4.21 56.53 5.18 22.14
Observations 15,931 15,931 1,830 10,273 15,225
Notes: This table shows the results of the first stage of the 2SLS strategy presented in Section 4, Panel
A for high-skilled migrants and Panel B for low-skilled migrants. Our instrument for the distance in
the quality of institutions is the distance in the Scrabble index of the name of the origin and destination
countries. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 4: IV: Scrabble distance in country names
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Adjusted Observed Non-Imputed Non-English Visa
Migrants Migrants Cells Dest.|Orig. Restrictions
PANEL A: High-skilled
∆ PCA 2.201∗∗∗ 2.492∗∗∗ 1.833∗ 4.961∗ 1.321∗∗∗
(0.619) (0.683) (1.063) (2.746) (0.264)
∆ Wage 0.010∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.035 0.018∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.023) (0.009) (0.001)
∆ Population -0.012∗∗ -0.011∗ 0.034 -0.061∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.053) (0.030) (0.004)
∆ Diaspora 0.261∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗ 0.224∗∗ -0.122 0.405∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.106) (0.112) (0.383) (0.039)
∆IMR 7.343∗∗∗ 8.314∗∗∗ 9.235 16.022∗ 4.277∗∗∗
(2.281) (2.517) (7.868) (9.333) (1.022)
∆ Visa -0.022
(0.049)
R2 0.44 0.45 0.12 0.40 0.22
Observations 15,931 15,931 1,830 10,273 15,225
PANEL B: low-skilled
∆ PCA 2.597 1.769 3.832∗∗∗ -1.750 1.056∗
(1.605) (1.368) (0.708) (1.467) (0.543)
∆ Wage 0.003 0.011 0.084∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.020) (0.011) (0.027) (0.007)
∆ Population -0.043∗∗ -0.035∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗ 0.016 -0.028∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.016) (0.031) (0.024) (0.010)
∆ Diaspora 0.960∗∗∗ 0.757∗∗∗ 1.727∗∗∗ 0.091 0.659∗∗∗
(0.327) (0.279) (0.299) (0.275) (0.123)
∆IMR 9.404∗ 6.460 23.339∗∗∗ -5.179 4.197∗∗
(5.665) (4.827) (4.376) (4.601) (2.038)
∆ Visa 0.075
(0.054)
R2 0.30 0.31 0.26 0.33 0.30
Observations 15,931 15,931 1,830 10,273 15,225
Notes: This table shows the results of the second stage of the 2SLS strategy presented in Section 4.
The dependent variable is the log net migration flow. Panel A shows results for high-skilled migrants
and Panel B shows results for low-skilled migrants. Our instrument for the distance in the quality of
institutions is the distance in the Scrabble index of the name of the origin and destination countries.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 5: Outflows and Inflows Regressions
Outflows Inflows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
high-skilled low-skilled high-skilled low-skilled
PANEL A: high-skilled
PCA Home -0.236∗∗∗ -0.354∗∗∗ 0.958∗∗∗ 0.010
(0.074) (0.085) (0.115) (0.150)
PCA Foreign 0.347∗∗∗ 0.073 -0.343∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗
(0.070) (0.105) (0.097) (0.113)
∆ Wage -0.011∗∗∗ -0.016∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.009) (0.004) (0.011)
Diaspora 0.628∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.052) (0.042)
Colonial Links 0.305∗ -0.199 0.604∗∗∗ -0.158
(0.157) (0.348) (0.234) (0.438)
Distance -0.110 -0.036 -0.136 -0.230
(0.086) (0.144) (0.199) (0.259)
Common Language 0.378∗∗ 0.054 0.846∗∗∗ 0.217
(0.153) (0.181) (0.234) (0.253)
Common Border -0.141 0.199 1.149∗ 2.263∗∗
(0.245) (0.275) (0.589) (0.908)
Origin Residents 0.202∗∗∗ 0.036 0.447∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.026) (0.073) (0.082)
Destination Residents 0.116∗∗ 0.024 0.337∗∗∗ 0.158
(0.047) (0.054) (0.101) (0.115)
R2 0.76 0.19 0.43 0.67
Observations 15,931 15,930 15,931 15,930
Notes: All regressions are run using PPML. The dependent variable is the outflow between two coun-
tries in levels. Panel A shows results for high-skilled migrants and Panel B shows results for low-skilled
migrants. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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